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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence showing that smaller countries tend to have more 
volatile government spending for a sample of 160 countries from 1960 to 2000. We argue 
that the larger size of a country decreases the volatility of government spending because it 
acts as an insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, and it leads to increasing returns to scale 
due to the higher ability of the government to spread its cost of financing over a larger pool 
of taxpayers. The results are robust to different time and country samples, different 
econometric techniques and to several sets of control variables. The analysis also evinces 
that country size is negatively related to the discretionary part of government spending and 
to the volatilities of most of the government spending items. 
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Government Size, Fiscal Volatility, Country Size. 
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This paper provides empirical evidence showing that smaller countries tend to have 
more volatile government spending. From a theoretical point of view, we show that a 
negative relationship between government spending volatility and country size can be 
explained by two arguments: i) to the extent that government spending is used for fine 
tuning purposes, the size of a country acts as an insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, 
leading to a less volatile government spending; ii) increasing returns to scale of government 
spending originating from higher ability to spread the cost of financing it over a larger pool 
of taxpayer, allow the government to provide the public good in a less volatile way. 
These claims are confirmed by our empirical analysis, which is robust to different 
time and country samples, different econometric techniques and to several sets of control 
variables. 
Our results highlight the need for small countries to undertake fiscal adjustments in 
order to reduce macro-fiscal vulnerabilities and improve their economic growth prospects. 
In addition, to the extent that large fiscal areas reduce government spending volatility, our 
findings reinforce the role of fiscal coordination (or common fiscal policy) in monetary 
unions. 6
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1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a growing economic literature concentrating on the 
effects of scale and country size on various economic outcomes.  From a theoretical point 
of view, the sign of these scale and size effects is ambiguous (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). 
Empirically, even though Rose (2006) concludes that countries performance in terms of 
several indicators is not related with the size of the nation, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) 
robustly show that smaller countries have higher levels of public consumption as a share of 
GDP
1. This latter finding originates from economies of scale in the production of public 
goods and redistributive policies resulting from the higher ability of governments in big 
countries to spread the cost of financing public goods over a larger pool of taxpayers. 
Notwithstanding this level effect, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of the 
size of nations upon the volatility of government spending has not yet been discussed in the 
literature. Government spending volatility may be decreasing in the size of nations given 
that smaller economies are found to be more volatile and exposed to economic shocks 
(Furceri and Karras, 2007 and 2008). More specifically, we claim that a negative 
relationship between government spending volatility and country size can be explained by 
two arguments:  
1) To the extent that government spending is used for fine tuning purposes, 
smaller economies, characterized by more volatile output and more 
exposure to idiosyncratic shocks, may use government spending more 
aggressively. 
2) To the extent that public goods are of a non-rival nature, increasing returns 
to scale of varying government spending may originate from the higher 
                                                 
1 See, in addition, Bolton and Roland (1997), Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and Alesina et al. (2004). 7
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ability to spread the cost of financing it over a larger pool of taxpayers. 
This promotes less volatile government expenditure in particular if public 
goods are, as desirable as, or more desired than private consumption. 
 
Nevertheless, other effects of country size may work in the opposite direction. For 
instance, more individual heterogeneity may prompt bigger political divergences in terms 
of preferences for type and size of public goods (O’Higgins and Ruggles, 1981), resulting 
in larger government spending volatility due to the switching of different political groups in 
power. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyze the empirical relationship 
between government spending volatility and country size. Such analysis is further 
motivated by the finding that higher volatility of public spending impacts negatively on 
economic growth and welfare (see, among others, Fatás and Mihov, 2003 and 2005; 
Furceri, 2007; Afonso and Furceri, 2008; and Loayza et al., 2007). Fatás and Mihov (2003), 
for example,  estimate that every percentage point increase in volatility of discretionary 
fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points. In turn, Herrera 
(2007) estimates that the welfare loss of public spending volatility corresponds to 8 percent 
of consumption in developing countries
2. Most of these effects of volatility occur via its 
negative impact on capital formation and investment as the theories of irreversible 
investment emphasize (see, in addition, Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aghion and Banerjee, 
2005; and Imbs, 2007). 
                                                 
2 For other analysis on the effects of public spending volatility on the welfare and capital formation of 
developing countries see Afonso et al. (2006) and Harberger (2005). 8
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Our empirical analysis uses a panel data set that includes 160 countries with 
observations from 1960 to 2000 and yields as main results that: 1) smaller countries have 
more volatile government spending; 2) discretionary government spending volatility 
(corrected for output volatility) is decreasing with the size of nations; 3) consumption 
spending in Defense, Economic Affairs, Housing, Health, Recreation and Education is 
more volatile in smaller countries, but it is not in Public Services, Public Order, and Social 
Protection. These results are extremely robust to different time and country samples, 
different econometric techniques as well as to several sets of control variables. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical 
model that discusses the arguments linking country size and volatility of government 
spending. The third section describes the paper’s empirical methodology used to test for the 
relationship between country size and government spending volatility. The fourth section 
reports the results.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Model 
 
This section presents a simple closed economy model based on Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998), which illustrates why smaller countries could have more volatile 
government spending. We modify and extend that model in three ways. First, we use a 
different utility specification, even though our specification provides similar qualitative 
results as in Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). Second, we allow individual heterogeneity in 
consumption, by assuming a different income endowment for each consumer. That 
assumption introduces idiosyncratic income shocks in our model and it is useful to analyze 
how a bigger country can mitigate the effects of those shocks. Third, we use a two-period 
version of the model to compute the volatility of government spending. 9
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Consider a country composed of N individuals. The Social Planner maximizes the 
expected sum of utilities of all individuals: 





















, ,   E                 (1) 
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t, E is the social 
discount factor, ci,t is the private consumption of individual i in period t, and Gt is the level 
of non-rival public goods in period t. The functions u and v are further assumed to be 
increasing in c and G, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. 
  In each period households are endowed with an income level yi,t, on which they 
have to pay taxes. The resulting net income is assumed to be consumed at the same period, 
so that the individual household flow budget constraint reads: 
 , 1 , , t i t i y c W  d                        (2) 
where W denotes the constant and exogenous (income) tax rate. 
  In this society each individual is further assumed to live in a distinct region that 
faces an idiosyncratic income shock Hi,t. Thus, in each period the stochastic income 
endowment is given by: 
, , , t i t i y y H                            ( 3 )  
where  y is the average income level assumed for simplicity to be constant over time. 
Moreover, for every period, the income shock Hi,t is independently and identically 
distributed among the individuals (regions) with expected value equal to zero and standard 
deviation equal to VH. Hence, by the Law of Large Numbers, the country’s income shock 
(sum of idiosyncratic shocks) converges to its expected value the larger is the number of 
individuals in the country. 10
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The government, in turn, raises tax revenues Tt and purchases goods Gt every 
period. For simplicity, we also assume that the government does not borrow, which makes 
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Without any further constraints and using (2) and (3), the period-by-period resource 
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The Social Planner maximizes then (1) subject to (4) with respect to ci,t and Gt, 
which by assuming perfect foresight leads to: 





t i G Nv c u   ¦
 
                       ( 5 )  
This condition shows that the average marginal utility of consumption is equal to 
the marginal utility of government spending when welfare is maximized in this economy. 
Further, to assess the overall effect of changes in the population size N on government 
spending volatility, we resort to the following quadratic utility function: 
   ,   1 / ,   1    ,   0 , 2 / 1 ) (
2   ! !        [ [ [ Z [ [
Z
x and x x
x v
x u          (6) 
where the restriction   1 /   [ [ x  ensures that the marginal utilities of private consumption 
and public spending are always positive, and the parameter Z regulates the desirability of 
                                                 
3 Notice that, in fact, governments use public debt management to cushion the effect of income shocks on its 
revenues and to keep government expenditures more stable (see Herrera, 2007). However, not all countries 
can rely on such instrument. Moreover, this simplifying non-borrowing assumption is useful here to test how 
the country size impacts on that volatility. 11
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public spending relative to private consumption. The higher is Z the more desirable is 
government expenditure compared to private consumption
4. 
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  Further, from (3) and (7) the effect of country size on the government expenditure 
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, H is not too high
6. If government spending is as desirable as, or more desirable than 
private consumption, then an increase in country size leads to a fall in the government 
spending-income ratio. 
As Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) discuss, an increase in country size raises the 
optimal level of public spending provision, which can be interpreted as an income effect; 
but it also reduces per capita cost of public goods for a given level of provision, allowing 
more private consumption (substitution effect). This latter effect comes from the higher 
                                                 
4 For more details and another application of equation (6) see, among others, Poplawski Ribeiro and Beetsma 
(2008). 
5 Notice that [  can always be chosen such that equation (7) provides a larger Gt when government 
expenditure compared to private consumption becomes more desirable (higher Z). 
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ability of the government to spread the cost of financing public goods over a larger pool of 
taxpayers (higher N) leading to increasing returns to scale. Therefore, expression (8) shows 
that if government expenditure is as desirable as private consumption, the substitution 
effect dominates and the ratio Gt /Yt falls when N increases. 
In addition, we can easily obtain the variance of government spending in this simple 
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Hence, the effect of an increase in N on the variance of government spending becomes: 
  

























             (10) 
Equation (10) shows that the larger the country size, the lower the variance of 
government spending. That is due to two main effects. First, by the Law of Large Numbers, 
the income shocks Hi,1 and Hi,2 converge to their expected values the bigger the country size 
(higher N), thus moving that variance towards zero. Intuitively, larger countries are less 
exposed to specific idiosyncratic shocks, and therefore, government revenues and 
expenditures become less volatile (see also Rodrik, 1998). Moreover, it is possible to argue 
that, the larger the country the less exposure to “shock surprises” (Hi,1 - Hi,2) and the lower 
the output volatility VHsee Furceri and Karras, 2007 and 2008). 
Second, an increase in country size eases the provision of a less volatile government 
expenditure, which is preferred the more desired is the public good compared to private 13
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consumption. That is again due to the increasing returns to scale of that non-rival good, and 
the consequent reduction in the per capita cost of public goods for a given level of 
provision when N goes up. In fact, as previously argued, if government spending is as 
desirable as, or more desirable then private consumption ( 1 t Z ), then an increase in the 
country size leads to a fall in government spending-income ratio. Similarly it is possible to 
see from equation (9) that an increase in the desirability of public consumption over private 
consumption ( n Z ) will lead to a decrease in spending volatility. 
In sum, our model illustrates reasons for less volatile government expenditure in 
larger countries, namely lower exposure to idiosyncratic risks and economies of scale in 
public goods provision. Nevertheless, the magnitude and the sign of the effect of country 
size on the volatility of government spending remains an empirical question, on which the 
next sections delve into. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Data for government expenditure is retrieved from the Penn World Table 6.2. The 
dataset consists of 160 countries, which had available data for each of the years from 1960 
to 2000.  We use the log of its population as our measure of a country’s size, and the 
standard deviation of annual growth of government consumption spending
7 as our measure 
for government spending volatility
8. 
                                                 
7 We use the annual growth rate of total government expenditure as dependent variable rather than annual 
growth rate of government total expenditure (or total revenue), since the latter is not available for such an 
extensive set of countries for a long time span. Moreover, government consumption accounts usually for 
approximately 4/5 of total expenditure.  
8 The choice of the standard deviation of the growth rate of real government spending as measure of spending 
volatility could be criticized since, usually, countries with higher growth rates of government spending have 
higher standard deviations. An alternative measure to control for this “scale” effect could be to consider the 
coefficient of variation as a measure of volatility. However, there is an obvious problem when we compute 
the coefficient of variation: for some countries (with highly volatile government spending) the average growth 14
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We set up our estimated models in a number of different ways.  In particular, we use 
(i) OLS both in a bivariate model and in models controlling for a country-specific volatility 
effect; (ii) Fixed Effects estimation; (iii) Random Effect estimation; and (iv) Instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation both in a bivariate model and in models with control variables. 
Similarly to Rose’s (2006) and Furceri and Karras (2007, 2008) strategy, we use 
four different sets of control variables, most of them obtained from Rose’s website 
(www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose)
9.  
 The first set of controls includes: (a) the urbanization rate, (b) population density, 
(c) the log of absolute latitude (kilometers from the equator), (d) a binary dummy variable 
for a landlocked country, (e) an island-nation dummy, (f) a high income country dummy, 
(g) regional dummies for developing countries from 1) Latin America, 2) Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 3) East Asia, 4) South Asia, 5) Europe-Central Asia, 6) and Middle East-North 
Africa, and (h) language dummies for countries that speak 1) English, 2) French, 3) 
German, 4) Dutch, 5) Portuguese, 6) Spanish, 7) Arabic, and 8) Chinese.  Many of these 
variables are related to the quality of governments. In fact, as pointed out by La Porta et al. 
(1998), it is likely that latitude from the equator, income and regional dummies are related 
to the quality of government and institutions. Moreover, by including language dummies 
                                                                                                                                                     
rate over some time spans turns out to be negative, implying thus a very low measure of volatility in contrast 
with the evidence. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results with two other measures of government 
spending. The first is the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real government spending (Furceri, 
2007; Afonso and Furceri, 2008). Its use avoids the “scale” problem since the time average of the cyclical 
component by construction is zero for each country. The second measure is the ratio between the standard 
deviation of real government spending and the average level of government spending. Its use avoids business-
cycle effects resulting from the employment of annual data. All results of this paper are qualitatively 
unchanged if we use these measures of volatility. 
9 See Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the variables and their source. 15
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we are able to capture (at least in part) different level of language fractionalization among 
countries
10.  
The second set of control variables augments the first set including also dummies to 
control for the effect of new, decolonized, and COMECON countries (see Alesina and 
Wacziarg, 1998): (a) a dummy for countries created post-World War 2, (b) a dummy for 
countries created after 1800 but before 1945, (c) a dependency dummy, (d) an OPEC 
dummy, and (e) a COMECON dummy.   
The  third set of controls includes four other macroeconomic variables that are 
associated with government volatility: (a) GDP per capita
11, (b) Openness
12, (c) CPI 
Inflation, and (d) Government size
13. In fact, as pointed out by Fatás and Mihov (2003) it is 
likely that poor countries have shorter and more volatile business cycles due to less 
developed financial markets, for example, and at the same time they may resort more often 
to discretionary policy (see also Rand and Tarp, 2002). Similarly, economies with a higher 
degree of openness, and thus more exposed to external shocks, may use more frequently 
discretionary countercyclical fiscal policies (Rodrik, 1998). Moreover, countries with 
bigger government are usually characterized by bigger automatic stabilizers and thus are 
less tempted to use discretionary measure of fiscal policy for fine tuning purposes (Fatás 
and Mihov, 2001).  
The main advantage of this set of controls is that they are variables usually 
associated with government volatility, which are available for all the period under study. 
                                                 
10 In the following of the analysis we will use other variables as proxy of ethnic fractionalization. The use of 
language dummies to this purpose, at this stage, is justified for the greater data availability. 
11 Although the inclusion of GDP per capita could lead to multicollinearity since both population and GDP 
per capita may account for scale effects, in our sample these two variables result to be scarcely correlated 
(0.07). 
12 We use as proxy for openness the GDP’s share of total exports and imports. 
13 Government size is here measured as the ratio of government spending to GDP. 16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 924
August 2008
Moreover, other variables for which we have data just for the last decade could also be 
important determinants for government volatility. For this purpose, we consider a fourth set 
of controls for which we have data only relatively to the last time period 1991-2000. The 
variables included are those of the third set of controls plus: (a) an index of the level of 
Democracy, (b) an index for the level of Corruption, (c) an index for Political Stability, (d) 
an index for Government Effectiveness, (e) an index for Country Risk, and (f) an index for 
language fractionalization.  
To summarize, we estimate the effect (ȕ) of country size on government spending 
volatility using the following regression model: 
             ln(ıi,t-t+W) = E ln(Popit) + D + {JtTt} + ȈjGjXijt +  Hit                   (11) 
where ı measures government spending volatility for country i at time t, Pop denotes 
population, {Tt} denotes a set of time- specific fixed effects, and {Xj} denotes a set of 
control variables. H is a well-behaved residual, and D, {J}, {G}, are the coefficients of our 





Figures 1 provides the scatter plot of government spending volatility (measured by 
the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of government expenditure) against 
country size (measured by the natural logarithm of population) for the entire period 1960-
2000.  The figure exhibits negative and statistically significant relation between these two 
variables. In particular, the estimate of this simple bivariate relation for the full sample 
gives us: 
 ıi = 0.207 - 0.011 ln(Popi) 
                                       (7.77)  (-3.40) 17
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with R
2 = 0.06, and t statistics shown in parenthesis.  The relationship is clearly negative 
and statistically significant, even though the relatively low value of the R-squared 
coefficient suggests that other factors could have a significant impact on volatility of 
government spending
 14.  Moreover, the coefficient of country size does not seem to be 
affected by outliers such as those countries with volatility higher than 0.3.  To confirm this, 
running again the regression, this time excluding outliers, the relationship is still negative 
and actually strengthened
15: 
ıi= 0.169 - 0.008 ln(Popi) 
                                       (9.90)  (-3.92) 
with R
2 = 0.08, and t statistics shown in parenthesis.  
 
We now proceed with more formal statistical evidence.  Table 1 reports the 
estimated slope coefficient (ȕ) of country size, along with the associated t-statistics in 
parentheses for several specifications of equation (11).  In particular, the four columns of 
Table 1 correspond to: (i) bivariate OLS; (ii) OLS including the first set of controls; (iii) 
OLS including the second set of controls; and (iv) OLS including the third set of controls. 
Focusing on the full-period (pooled) 1961-2000, it can be readily seen that the 
relation between country size and government expenditure volatility is negative and 
                                                 
14 Since our dependent variable is based on estimates (sample standard deviation) the regression residuals can 
be thought of as having two components. The first component is sampling error (the difference between the 
true value of the dependent variable and its estimated value). The second component is the random shock that 
would have been obtained even if the dependent variable was directly observed rather than estimated. This 
would lead to an increase of the standard deviation of the estimates, which will lower the t-statistics. This 
means that any correction to the presence of this un-measurable error term will increase the significance of 
our estimates. A second concern is the possibility of heteroskedasticity. However, in most of our estimations 
heteroskedasticity does not seem to be a problem.  When it does, we correct for that by using White standard 
errors. 
15 Estimating a non linear relation, the relation is still significant and negative: 
ıi= 0.169 +0.022 ln(Popi)- 0.022 ln(Popi)
2 
                                       (9.90)  (1.34)               (-1.94) 18
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statistically significant: the larger the size of the country, the less volatile its government 
expenditure. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on size remains negative and significant in 
every specification. In particular, two considerations are important. First, the magnitude of 
the coefficient is broadly constant over the different set of controls. Second, the coefficient 
remains significant even after controlling for an exhaustive set of regional, geographical, 
and macroeconomic variables
16. In fact, we believe it is significant that country size is 
shown to reduce government spending volatility even when we control for openness, since 
trade openness is the only variable found to be robustly and significantly related with 
country size (Rose, 2006)
17.   
The interpretation of the coefficient relative to country size is the following. By our 
estimations, an increase of one percent in population will determine a decrease of 0.2 
percent in government expenditure volatility (on average). In other words, just because 
Germany is ten times the size of Belgium, means that Germany has 50 percent less volatile 
government expenditure than Belgium. 
We have also examined the robustness of the relation between country size and 
fiscal volatility with respect to different time periods. In particular, we considered six 
different time samples: 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Table 2 
presents, across the above mentioned time periods, the coefficient on country size obtained 
                                                 
16 In our estimations, Island, Arabic language, OPEC, and Government Size are other variables that we find to 
be highly significant. For Island countries that could be attributed to the fact that they are more open to 
foreign trade, even though expenditure volatility is very high for some of these countries (Le Borgne and 
Medas, 2007). In turn, Arabic and OPEC economies are rich in oil revenues and contingent upon that 
commodity. Hence, the volatility in oil price might explain the higher volatility of government spending on 
those countries. 
17 As robustness check, we also include private consumption volatility and public debt in the third set of 
controls of Table 1. The first variable turns out highly significant and positive (not shown here), but country 
size still remains highly significant when controlling for it. The link between public expenditure and 
household consumption results from the transfers made by the governments or the taxes paid by households 
(Herrera, 2007).  Public debt, in turn, is insignificant in our estimations. Further, its inclusion reduces 
substantially the number of countries in the sample, which hams the significance of all other variables, 
including that of country size. 19
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using the same specification as in Table 1. Our results suggest that while the effect of 
country size on government expenditure volatility remains negative and statistically 
significant, the magnitude increases over time, especially in the last decade. From a 
statistical point of view, this could be attributed to a lower number of degrees of freedom 
for this sample period (for the first sample period), and to the fact that government 
expenditure has been poorly measured during the first years. From an economic point of 
view, a possible interpretation, as suggested by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998), is that many 
new decolonized had to “build up” their public sector during the first time samples, and as 
their level and volatility of government expenditure converged to a sort of steady state 
level, the effect of the fundamental determinants of government volatility started to play a 
larger role.  
Another robustness check that we provide involves the use of different estimation 
techniques. Tables 3 and 4 report the estimated slope coefficient of country size for the 
first, second, and third set of controls with: (i) Fixed Effects and Time Random Effects; and 
(ii) IV estimation, respectively
18. Analyzing these tables we can immediately see that the 
effect of country size on government volatility is still robust to all methods of estimations. 
In particular, while the magnitude of the coefficient is broadly unchanged over the different 
                                                 
18 We use the logarithm of the country’s total area as instrumental variable for the log of its population, as did 
Rose (2006), Furceri and Karras (2007, 2008) and as argued by Drazen (2000). The F-statistic of the simple 
regression of log of population on log of total area is 2070.43, which suggests that the possible bias of the IV 
is substantially lower than the one of the OLS (Staiger and Stock, 1997). There is also very little concern of 
reverse causality. In fact, it is very unlikely that people choose where to live based on consideration of 
government spending volatility. In contrast, there could a more serious issue of endogeneity for other controls 
variables (as inflation). We address this issue (and also the one for our variable of interest) considering the 
starting value of the control between time t and time t+W, while we use a measure of volatility of time(t, t+W 20
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techniques of estimation and set of controls, its significance level increases with respect to 
OLS and IV when we control for time effects both Fixed and Random
19. 
    The analysis presented so far has shown that the effect of country size on 
government spending volatility is very robust to different econometric techniques and sets 
of controls. However, other variables for which we have data only for the last decade, such 
as Democracy, Corruption, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Country risk and 
language fractionalization, can account for higher fiscal volatility. To check for robustness, 
we consider these variables in the OLS and IV estimation. The results are reported in Table 
5. Again the results are robust. In particular, while the coefficient on population is still 
statistically significant its magnitude is increased. 
  It is possible to argue that most of the variation in many determinants of fiscal 
volatility (such as political constraints, income, inflation and etc.) occurs between the rich 
and the poor countries. Thus, both from a theoretical perspective and (especially) from a 
policy point of view is important to assess whether the relationship between country size 
and government spending volatility is still negative within each group (Rich and Poor
20). 
While, we have already shown that our analysis still holds when we include as control 
variable the level of GDP and income dummies, it would be important also to run two 
different regressions for each group of countries. Table 6 conveys the results. They show 
                                                 
19 According to the Hausman test, the Fixed Effects specification is preferred to the Random Effects. 
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis of absence of time effects at 5% significant level. Similarly, the 
inclusion of country effect does not improve the fitness of our model either the significance of our estimates. 
This is mainly due to the fact that country effects are to some extent captured by language and regional 
dummies. However, by including only country effects in the regression with the third set of controls the 
magnitude of the coefficient of country size increases (to -0.77) and its significance level remains high (t-
statistic=-4.50). 
20 We use the World Bank classification to differentiate among Rich and Poor countries. In particular, we 
includes in Poor countries those countries classifies as “Low Income”, “Lower Middle Income”, and “Upper 
Middle Income”; and we include in the Rich countries those classifies as “High Income-non OECD” and 
“High Income-OECD”. 21
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that while the coefficient on population has the same sign across the two different groups, 
the magnitude and significance level is bigger for Poor countries. 
  Finally, our empirical analysis regarding volatility of aggregate government 
consumption concludes using a proxy for discretionary spending volatility, instead of 
general government spending volatility, as our dependent variables.  
It is important to stress the fact that there is no consensus in the literature on the 
appropriate measure of discretionary (cyclically adjusted) fiscal policy
21. The difficulty 
mainly comes from the simultaneity in the determination of output and government 
spending volatility. To this purpose we use a measure of discretionary fiscal policy that is 
not affected by output volatility. In more detail, following Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) 
our measure is obtained by estimating, for each country i, the following equation:           
                          ,     , , 1 , , , , t i t i i t i i t i i t i t i W G Y G H G J E D   '  '    '                         (12) 
where G is the logarithm of real government spending, Y is the logarithm of real GDP, and 
W includes a time trend, inflation and inflation squared. The estimated standard deviation 
of the residuals (i.e.   W W H V      t t i t i , , var ) is assumed as a quantitative estimate of 
discretionary fiscal policy volatility. In order to estimate equation (11) we include the 
contemporaneous value of output growth and we use past values as instrumental variable to 
avoid the possibility of endogeneity bias. We instrument current output growth with lagged 
GDP growth, the index of oil prices, lagged inflation, and the lagged value of government 
spending growth. 
Table 7 presents the coefficient on country size obtained using the same 
specification used in Table 1. Our results point out that the effect of country size on 
                                                 
21 See Alesina and Perotti (1996), Blanchard (1993) and Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006) for a detailed 
discussion on alternative measures of discretionary fiscal policy. 22
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discretionary government spending volatility is still negatively and statistically significant. 
Thus, not only smaller countries have more volatile general government spending but they 
also, independently of automatic stabilizers, tend to use government spending more 
actively. This could suggest that the relation between spending volatility and country size is 
negative not only to the extent that government spending is used for fine tuning purposes, 
but also to the extent that public goods are of a non rival nature. 
4.1 Government Spending Volatility by Functional Categories 
Our analysis, so far, has pointed out a clear negative relation between government 
spending volatility and country size. However, to better understand this relation it is useful 
to analyze the different components of government consumptions. For this purpose, we 
consider the following categories: i) General public services; ii) Defense; iii) Public order 
and safety; iv) Economic affairs; v) Housing and community amenities; vi) Health; vii) 
Recreation, culture and religion; viii) Education; and ix) Social protection
22.  
As we discussed in our theoretical section, a larger country size may reduce 
government spending volatility because of the higher returns to scale of the non-rival good. 
To this extent, we should expect spending volatility related to non-rival public goods (such 
as general administration) to be more associated with country size than spending volatility 
related to rival public goods (such as education, health, and order and safety).  
However, our theoretical model also evinces that larger countries are more able to 
mitigate idiosyncratic shocks and stabilize its government spending. Therefore, we should 
expect, to a certain extent, all items of government spending to be negatively associated 
with country size. 
                                                 
22 Data for government consumption classified by function are retrieved by the UN and OECD data sets. 23
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    Table 8 shows the results of the regression between government consumption 
volatility classified by economic function and country size for the period 1971-2000 and 
using the third set of control variables
23. Each of the columns of the table corresponds to a 
different economic function of government consumption. 
Analyzing the results, we can observe that the relation between government 
consumption and country size is negative for each of the different categories. Thus, these 
results seem to confirm the idea that smaller countries tend to have more volatile 
government spending also because they are more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. 
Moreover, from all spending items analyzed, economic affairs and public order are the one 
whose the coefficient of country size is more significant, which might be due to the high 
level of non-rivalry of these goods.  
  Summarizing, this analysis has confirmed the findings of our theoretical model that 
due to both, the higher scale economies in the provision of non-rival public goods and to a 




This paper provides empirical evidence showing that smaller countries tend to have 
more volatile government spending. From a theoretical point of view, we show that a 
negative relationship between government spending volatility and country size can be 
explained by two arguments: i) to the extent that government spending is used for fine 
tuning purposes, the size of a country acts as an insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, 
                                                 
23 The results are qualitatively robust also to the inclusion of the additional variables present in the fourth 
control set. 24
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leading to a less volatile government spending; ii) increasing returns to scale of government 
spending originating from higher ability to spread the cost of financing it over a larger pool 
of taxpayer, allow the government to provide the public good in a less volatile way. 
These claims are confirmed by our empirical analysis, which is robust to different 
time and country samples, different econometric techniques and to several sets of control 
variables. In particular, disaggregating government consumption by function, it emerges 
that government consumption spending in all functions is more volatile in smaller 
countries. In addition, the empirical analysis evinces that the discretionary (not reacting to 
the state of economy for fine tuning purpose) government spending volatility is also 
decreasing with the size of nations. 
Our paper highlights the need for small countries to undertake fiscal adjustments in 
order to reduce macro-fiscal vulnerabilities and improve their economic growth prospects 
(see also Le Borgne and Medas, 2007; and Medina Cas and Ota, 2008). In addition, to the 
extent that large fiscal areas reduce government spending volatility, our findings reinforce 
the role of fiscal coordination and the move towards common fiscal policy in monetary 
unions, even though other factors may undermine and overcome such fiscal manoeuvre 
(see, among others, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998; Beetsma et al., 2001; and von Hagen et 
al. 2002). 
The current analysis also offers various possibilities for further research. On the 
theoretical side, a more structural model would be helpful to better understand the 
mechanisms underlying the economic and political effects of country size on the 
government spending volatility. For instance, modeling the political side of the economy 
could be useful to investigate the impacts of country size and political heterogeneity on our 
variable of interest. On the empirical side, an analysis of the effects of country size on the 25
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volatility of taxes revenues, transfers, and debt management could ratify our findings that 
that variable indeed acts as an insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, and show how strong 
this effect is indeed. 26
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Table A. Summary Statistic and Source for the Main Variables 
 
Description    Source    # Obs.    Mean     St. Dev. 
Government Spending 
Volatility    PWT6.2   451  0.015    0.017 
Log of Population    PWT6.2    832    14.852    2.303 
Urbanization  Rate    Rose  819   48.842    24.839 
Density    Rose  710   253.421    1300.324 
Latitude    Rose  832  9.577    15.208 
GDP per capita    Rose    612    5220.501    7780.298 
Openness    Rose  582   76.572    45.310 
CPI  Inflation    Rose  504   55.799    499.7929 
Democracy    Rose  531  3.902    4.190 
Corruption    Rose  184   -0.004    1.001 
Political  Stability    Rose  165   -0.004    1.001 
Government 
Effectiveness    Rose  184   -0.006    1.000 
Country  Risk    Rose  139   67.937    11.743 
Language 
Fractionalization    Rose  191  0.394    .0280 
Notes: PWT6.2 refers to the Penn World Table v. 6.2. Rose refers to A.K. Rose’s website. 
 
 
Table B. Correlation between Government Spending Volatility Categories 
 
  GS  PU DE OS EA HO HE RE ED SP 
G S   1            
P U   0 . 2 1 5   1           
DE  0.164  0.044  1         
OS  0.173  0.591  0.092  1        
EA  0.440 0.320 0.249 0.561  1           
HO  0.088 0.207 0.078 0.255 0.341  1         
HE  0.026 0.397 0.162 0.753 0.423  0.21  1       
RE  -0.045 0.044 0.192 0.177 0.266  0.30 0.394  1     
ED  0.088 0.234 0.073 0.610 0.565  0.16 0.696 0.128  1   
SP  0.076 0.141 0.082 0.375 0.322  0.32 0.531 0.715 0.416  1 
GS= Government Spending; PU= General public services; DE= Defense; OS= Public order and safety; EA=Economic 
affairs; HO=Housing and community amenities; HE=Health; RE=Recreation, culture and religion; ED=Education; 
SP=Social protection. 30
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Table 1-Government Spending Volatility and Country Size  
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.098 -0.153 -0.160 -0.208 
  (-6.09)*** (-7.47)*** (-6.53)*** (-5.97)*** 
      
Urban  -  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  -  (-0.70) (-1.08) (-0.99) 
      
Density  -  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  -  (-1.57) (-0.29) (-0.75) 
      
Landlocked  -  -0.131 -0.071 -0.078 
  -  (-1.30) (-0.72) (-0.70) 
      
Island  -  -0.303 -0.238 -0.223 
 -  (-2.90)***  (-2.09)***  (-1.85)* 
      
English -  -0.079  -0.033  0.026 
 -  (-1.01)  (-0.41)  (0.31) 
      
French  -  -0.127 -0.015 -0.047 
  -  (-1.34) (-0.16) (-0.47) 
      
Spanish  -  -0.224 -0.110 -0.144 
 -  (-1.96)**  (-0.84)  (-1.02) 
      
Portuguese  -  -0.456 -0.210 -0.249 
 -  (-2.62)**  (-1.02)  (-0.94) 
      
Arabic  -  0.382 0.195 0.335 
 -  (3.43)***  (1.70)*  (2.38) 
      
German  -  -0.338 -0.236 -0.307 
  -  (-1.59) (-1.18) (-1.27) 
      
Dutch -  -0.276  -0.062  0.101 
 -  (-1.31)  (-0.28)  (0.43) 
      
Swedish  -  -0.742 -0.547 -0.375 
 -  (-1.82)*  (-1.43)  (-1.09) 
      
Chinese  -  0.656 0.780 0.544 
   (2.33)**  (2.07)**  (0.97) 
      
Latitude  from  -  -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
Equator -  (-1.21)  (-1.50)*  (-2.03)** 
      
Income    -  -0.132 -0.124 -0.114 
 -  (-3.28)***  (-2.84)***  (-2.19)** 32
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Opec -  -  0.982  0.746 
 -  -  (6.63)***  (5.67)*** 
      
Comecon -  -  0.212  -0.072 
 -  -  (0.97)  (-0.20) 
      
Independence -  - 0.000  -0.000 
 -  -  (0.30)  (-1.00) 
      
Post war  -  -  0.085  0.063 
 -  -  (0.64)  (0.41) 
      
Inflation  - - -  0.029 
  - - -  (1.72)* 
      
Openness  - - -  -0.003 
  - - -  (-0.03) 
      
GDP per capita  -  -  -  -0.001 
       (-1.02) 
      
Government Size        -0.013 
  - - -  (-3.38)*** 
N  545 438 376 275 
R
2  0.064 0.162 0.372 0.445 
Adjusted-R
2  0.062 0.130 0.337 0.392 
      
                 Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
                 *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%,5% and 1%. 
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Table 2. Government Spending Volatility and Country Size (OLS)-Robustness over time 
1961-1970 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.096 -0.109 -0.081 -0.054 
 (-2.26)**  (-2.25)**  (-1.67)*  (-0.63) 
      
N  94 94 91 66 
R
2  0.052 0.315 0.385 0.472 
Adjusted-R
2  0.042 0.183 0.215 0.227 
       
1971-1980 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.059 -0.099 -0.002 -0.182 
  (-1.79)* (-2.69)***  (-2.04)** (-2.11)** 
      
        
N  140 137 123  74 
R
2  0.022 0.334 0.354 0.423 
Adjusted-R
2  0.016 0.246 0.227 0.189 
      
1981-1990 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop -0.119  0.165  -0.149  -0.137 
  (-4.38)*** (-4.94)*** (-3.71)***  (-2.43)** 
      
N  146 144 126  93 
R
2  0.118 0.321 0.431 0.638 
Adjusted-R
2  0.111 0.235 0.322 0.516 
      
1991-2000 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.108 -0.188 -0.216 -0.221 
  (-3.42)*** (-4.88)*** (-4.54)*** (-3.51)*** 
      
N  160 149 124 109 
R
2  0.069 0.333 0.415 0.471 
Adjusted-R
2  0.063 0.252 0.301 0.320 
     
 
 
               Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
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Table 3. Government Spending Volatility and Country Size (Fixed & Random Effects) 
1961-2000 (FE) 
 Bivariate  Control1  Control2  Control3 
Lnpop -0.096  -0.149  -0.157  -0.190 
 (-5.94)***  (-7.22)*** (-6.47)***  (-5.42)*** 
        
N 545  438  376  275 
R
2-within 0.062  0.277  0.377  0.456 
R
2-between 0.858  0.562  0.619  0.998 
R
2-overall 0.064  0.274  0.371  0.440 
        
1961-2000 (RE) 
 Bivariate  Control1  Control2  Control3 
Lnpop -0.098  -0.153  -0.160  -0.208 
 (-6.09)***  (-7.47)*** (-6.53)***  (-5.97)*** 
        
N 545  438  376  275 
R
2-within 0.062  0.276  0.375  0.452 
R
2-between 0.858  0.428  0.494  0.867 
R
2-overall 0.064  0.275  0.372  0.445 
        
Hausman Test (FE vs RE)         
p-value 0.24  0.99  1.00  1.00 
                 Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 





Table 4. Government Spending Volatility and Country Size (IV) 
1961-2000  
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.054 -0.139 -0.161 -0.183 
  (-2.56)*** (-4.76)*** (-4.50)*** (-3.20)*** 
      
      
N  545 438 376 276 
R
2  0.051 0.274 0.372 0.304 
R
2-adjusted  0.049 0.246 0.337 0.242 
        
                Notes:  t-statistics in parenthesis; 
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Table 5. Government Spending Volatility and Country Size  
1991-2000  
  OLS & Control4  IV & Control4 
Lnpop -0.200 -0.138 
 (-2.59)***  (-1.39) 
    
N 100  100 
R
2 0.503  0.499 
R
2-adjusted 0.298  0.291 
    
     Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 




Table 6. Government Spending Volatility and Country Size (Rich and Poor countries) 
 
1961-2000 (Rich) 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.159 -0.092 -0.024 -0.069 
 (-6.70)***  (-2.96)***  (-0.65)  (-1.61)* 
      
      
N  228 190 166 133 
R
2  0.166 0.492 0.599 0.632 
R
2-adjusted  0.162 0.445 0.544 0.553 
        
1961-2000 (Poor) 
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.075 -0.154 -0.202 -0.307 
  (-3.53)*** (-4.25)*** (-4.60)*** (-5.24)*** 
      
       
N  317 248 210 146 
R
2  0.038 0.126 0.181 0.350 
R
2-adjusted  0.035 0.070 0.099 0.231 
       
                 Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
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Table 7-Discretionary Government Spending Volatility and Country Size  
  Bivariate Control1 Control2 Control3 
Lnpop  -0.075 -0.067 -0.029 -0.076 
 (-2.32)***  (-3.50)***  (-1.43)  (-3.14)*** 
      
Urban  -  0.005 0.005 0.005 
  -  (2.60)** (2.85)** (2.50)** 
      
Density  -  0.003 0.005 0.006 
 -  (1.77)*  (3.18)***  (3.90)*** 
      
Landlocked  -  0.116 0.169 0.135 
 -  (1.42)  (2.39)**  (1.96)** 
      
Island -  0.002  0.104  -0.002 
 -  (0.02)  (1.31)  (-0.02) 
      
English  -  -0.030 -0.053 -0.046 
  -  (-0.46) (-0.93) (-0.89) 
      
French  -  -0.082 -0.034 -0.038 
  -  (-1.17) (-0.56) (-0.66) 
      
Spanish  -  -0.002 0.072 -0.038 
  -  (-0.02) (0.94) (-0.49) 
      
Portuguese -  0.107  0.098  -0.109 
 -  (0.74)  (0.80)  (-0.83) 
      
Arabic -  0.052  0.005  -0.005 
 -  (0.54)  (0.06)  (-0.07) 
      
German  -  -0.520 -0.524 -0.427 
  -  (-3.29)*** (-3.93)*** (-2.73)*** 
      
Dutch  -  -0.570 -0.693 -0.654 
  -  (-2.76)*** (-3.91)*** (-3.77)*** 
      
Swedish  -  -0.545 -0.473 -0.399 
  -  (-2.26)** (-2.34)** (-2.20)** 
      
Chinese  -  -1.624 -2.573 -3.505 
   (-1.74)*  (-3.20)***  (-3.49)*** 
      
Latitude  from  -  0.000 0.000 0.001 
Equator  -  (0.09) (0.43) (0.58) 
      
Income    -  -0.260 -0.220 -0.146 
  -  (-8.82)*** (-8.20)*** (-4.39)*** 37
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Opec -  -  0.148  0.214 
 -  -  (1.35)  (2.10)** 
      
Independence -  - 0.003  0.002 
 -  -  (5.45)***  (3.86)*** 
      
Post war  -  -  -0.041  -0.103 
 -  -  (-0.39)  (-1.05) 
      
Inflation  - - -  0.015 
  - - -  (2.43)** 
      
Openness  - - -  -0.013 
  - - -  (-1.39) 
      
GDP per capita  -  -  -  -0.002 
       (-2.85)*** 
      
Government Size        -0.002 
  - - -  (-0.69) 
N  91 90 83 80 
R
2  0.057 0.790 0.871 0.905 
Adjusted-R
2  0.046 0.743 0.832 0.866 
      
                 Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
                 *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%,5% and 1%. 
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Table 8. Government Spending Volatility by Functional Classification and Country Size 
 PU  DE  OS  EA  HO  HE  RE  ED  SP 
Lnpop  -0.241 -0.180  -0.474 -0.352 -0.192 -0.284 -0.266  -0.315  -0.252 
 (-2.43)** (-1.69)*  (-2.43)**  (-3.81)*** (-2.11)** (-3.46)*** (-2.60)**  (-3.42)***  (-2.72)***
                  
                  
N  102  83  60 94 95 95 76 100 88 
R
2 0.342  0.554  0.555  0.533  0.460  0.524  0.632  0.233  0.342 
R
2-adjusted 0.159  0.391  0.290  0.388 0.295  0.378  0.479 0.027 0.132 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; PU= General public services; DE= Defense; OS= Public order and safety; EA=Economic 
affairs; HO=Housing and community amenities; HE=Health; RE=Recreation, culture and religion; ED=Education; 
SP=Social protection. 
*,**,*** respectively significant at 10%,5% and 1%. 
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